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Why It Is So Hard to Predict Our Partner’s
Product Preferences: The Effect of Target
Familiarity on Prediction Accuracy
DAVY LEROUGE
LUK WARLOP*
Many buying decisions require predictions of another person’s product attitudes.
Yet, consumers areofteninaccuratepredictors,evenforfamiliarothers.Weprovide
strong evidence that target familiarity can even hurt accuracy in the presence of
attitude feedback. Although overprojection and lack of product-speciﬁc attitude
information have been identiﬁed as possible reasons for prediction inaccuracy,our
results suggest a retrieval explanation. When presented with product-speciﬁc at-
titudefeedback,predictorsadaptedtheirlevelofprojectionandencodedtheattitude
information, but they did not use this information. Instead, they retrieved less di-
agnostic, pre-stored information about the familiar targets to predict their product
attitudes.
F
or many product decisions consumers predict others’
product attitudes. For instance, consumers are found to
make predictions about their co-consumers’ product pref-
erences before engaging in a joint decision process, such as
buying furniture or deciding where to have dinner (e.g.,
Krishnamurthi 1983; Park 1982). Also when buying prod-
ucts for others, such as when purchasing gifts, consumers
search for a product that matches the receiver’s attitudes
(e.g., Wooten 2000). Research on agent decision making
provides additional examples of people, varying from
knowledgeable neighbors to trained experts (like ﬁnancial
analysts and real estate agents), who make product attitude
predictions for others (e.g., Solomon 1986;West1996).Also
in personal selling, good salespeople need to empathizewith
the complex feelings and preferences of their customers
(Weitz, Sujan, and Sujan 1986). Similarly, productmanagers
often rely on their own intuitivepredictionsaboutconsumers
*Davy Lerouge is assistant professor of marketing at Tilburg University,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands (d.lerouge@uvt.nl).
Luk Warlop is professor of marketing at the Katholieke Universiteit Leu-
ven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium (luk.warlop@econ.kuleuven
.ac.be). This article is based on the ﬁrst author’s doctoral dissertation. The
authors acknowledge the helpful input of the editor, the associate editor,
and reviewers. In addition, the authors thank Joe Alba, Marnik Dekimpe,
Siegfried Dewitte, Steve Hoch, Mario Pandelaere, Rik Pieters, Dirk Smees-
ters, and Piet Vanden Abeele for their valuable comments on an earlier
version of this article.
Dawn Iacobucci served as editor and Eric Arnould served as associate
editor for this article.
Electronically published November 14, 2006
(Hoch 1988). If not, they use marketing research tools that
are frequently based on proxy reports by key informants
who are asked to predict the product feelings of others
(Menon et al. 1995). Finally, even for many decisions that
are made individually and for their own use, consumers
value social approval. For example, people take into account
the attitudes and preferences of referents such as coworkers
and friends when buying luxury and public products (e.g.,
Childers and Rao 1992). People who really like a speciﬁc
brand or product will hesitate to buy it if they predict that
their peers will not share theirpreference.Insum,consumers
(and marketers) predict the other’s product attitudesinmany
different situations. Hence, it is important to obtain more
insight into factors that affect the accuracy of these product
predictions.
In this article, we directly test the effect of familiarity
with the target person (i.e., for whom one is predicting the
product attitudes) on prediction accuracy. Although it could
intuitively be expected that target familiarity results in more
accurate predictions due to the extensive amount of pre-
stored target information, there is already some evidence
that people fail to properly predict a familiartarget’sproduct
attitudes. Marketing experts, for instance, were no more
accurate than novices in predicting the opinions of the U.S.
consumer (Hoch 1988). Of course, predicting the product
attitudes of a group differs from predicting the attitudes of
an individual. Yet, inaccuracy has also been observed when
consumers predict the product attitudes of familiar individ-
uals, like relationship partners. Davis, Hoch, and Ragsdale
(1986) found that only 53% of the partners were able to
outperform a hypothetical forecaster who simply used the394 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
average gender-speciﬁc preference. Related research in so-
cial psychology consistently demonstrated that neither re-
lationship length nor relationship involvement with the tar-
get person necessarily increases accuracy in predicting
beliefs, and personality traits (e.g., Swann and Gill 1997).
Kenny and Acitelli (2001), for instance, surprisingly found
that partner-related information contributed less to the over-
all prediction accuracy than the predictor’s own attitudes
did. However, these low levels of accuracy have typically
been observed for predictions on which diagnostic infor-
mation about the familiar targets is rather sparse. Davis et
al. (1986) used new (at that time) futuristic products, such
as a pop-top can for canned vegetables. Kenny and Acitelli
(2001) observed only low contributions of partner infor-
mation for predictions central to the relationship (e.g., feel-
ings of closeness, sexual enjoyment) and, therefore, prob-
ably quite sensitive, personal, and hardly discussed with the
partner. The opposite was found for topics less central to
the relationship (job satisfaction and feelings about the part-
ner’s family),onwhichpartnerspresumablyhaveexchanged
more information. Thus, a lack of diagnostic information
about the familiar target’s product-speciﬁc attitudes seems
an obvious and acceptableexplanationwhytargetfamiliarity
so far has been found to seldom affect the accuracy of
product predictions. This explanation also implies that it
would be easy to overcome prediction inaccuracy, once di-
agnostic target information is made available. In fact,West’s
(1996) ﬁnding that people quickly learn to predict a com-
plete stranger’s product attitudes when provided with prod-
uct-speciﬁc attitude feedback comports nicely with this rea-
soning.
The main contribution of the present study is to provide
convincing evidence that target familiarity induces predic-
tion problems far beyond a simple lack of diagnostic in-
formation. In fact, our main hypothesis is that familiarity
with the target person will even have a negative effect on
prediction accuracy in thepresenceofproduct-speciﬁctarget
feedback. Predictors can use this diagnostic feedback, but
they can also put a heavy weight on their own product
attitudes or on a variety of pre-stored information about the
target (e.g., Davis et al. 1986; Kenny and Acitelli 2001).
Hence, we distinguish two possible explanations for the pre-
dicted negative effect of target familiarity on prediction ac-
curacy. First, it can be that predictors overproject their own
attitudes on familiar others despite the availability of prod-
uct-speciﬁc feedback. Although West (1996) found that pre-
dictors of a stranger’s product attitudes were able to adapt
their level of projection based on product-speciﬁc attitude
feedback, we expect that predictors will stick to their own
attitudes when this feedback belongs to a familiar target.
For familiar targets, attitude similarity assumptions appear
to be much stronger than for unfamiliar ones (e.g., Moreland
and Zajonc 1982). Aron et al. (1991) even argued that in-
formation about familiar others is mixed with information
about the self. So it can be expected that predictors, at least
initially, assume the familiar other’s product attitudes to be
quite similar. These high similarity expectations likely color
the interpretation of new but ambiguous attitudeinformation
(e.g., Stapel and Schwarz 1998) and motivate predictors to
ignore attitudinal discrepancies (e.g., Davis and Rusbult
2001). Consequently, high levels of own attitude projection
may persist, despite the availability of veridical feedback
about the target’s product attitudes. Second, the predicted
negative effect of familiarity may also be the result of an
overly high reliance on pre-stored target information. The
information that people possess about familiar others has
often been found to be invalid or irrelevant when predicting
speciﬁc product attitudes (e.g., Davis et al. 1986; Swann
and Gill 1997). Despite its low validity, predictors tend to
use pre-stored information, thereby insufﬁciently adjusting
for more diagnostic feedback (e.g., Broniarczyk and Alba
1994). Such overweighing of pre-stored target information
will very likely increase with target familiarity. Predictors
typically possess an elaborateknowledgebaseaboutfamiliar
others. This huge diversity of pre-stored information about
familiar targets may cause predictors to have high conﬁ-
dence in their prediction abilities (Swann and Gill 1997)
and, in turn, limit their attention and sensitivity to new,
product-speciﬁc attitude feedback (Alba and Hutchinson
2000). Moreover, even if the product-speciﬁc attitude in-
formation is encoded properly, the impact of this truly di-
agnostic information is likely to be diluted by the extensive
amount of irrelevant information about the familiar target
(e.g., Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley 1981; Tetlock and Boett-
ger 1989).
Taking these two explanations together, we predict that
target familiarity will have a negative effect on prediction
accuracy if product-speciﬁc attitude feedback is available
because people will put heavy weight on their own attitudes
and their pre-stored target information at the cost of more
diagnostic attitude feedback. To test the speciﬁc effect of
target familiarity on the prediction process, we designed
three experiments in which we asked participants to predict
their relationship partner’s attitudes toward a series of prod-
uct alternatives. Instead of manipulating the prediction tar-
get, we manipulated the awareness that one is predicting the
partner’s attitudes. More speciﬁcally, in some conditions we
disguised the true identity of the target by telling the par-
ticipants they had to predict the product attitudes of a
stranger. In other conditions, we revealed the true identity
of the target and asked the participants to predict their part-
ner’s product attitudes. By keeping the target (i.e., the part-
ner) constant in all conditions, we avoided confounds (like
differences in attitude similarity). This way, we were able
to test the effect of target familiarity on a variety of pre-
diction measures. To calculate these measures we used the
established framework proposed by Hoch (1987, 1988; see
the appendix for more details). First, prediction accuracy
can be measured as the correlation between the predictions
and the target person’sactualattitudes.Thisoverallaccuracy
measure can be decomposed into the component due to the
projection of own product attitudes and the component due
to all other informationbeyondownattitudes(i.e.,pre-stored
target information and product-speciﬁc attitude feedback).TARGET FAMILIARITY AND PREDICTION ACCURACY 395
The accuracy-by-own attitudes can be measured as the level
of projection multiplied by the actual similarity of the part-
ner’s product attitudes. Intuitively, this means that when
partners have highly similar attitudes, predictors will attain
high levels of accuracy by projecting their own attitudes.
However, when the predictor’s attitudes and those of the
targetperson are uncorrelated(i.e.,attitudesimilarityisclose
to zero), projection will not add much to the overall pre-
diction accuracy. In turn, the level of projection (or the
weight given to own attitudes) can be measured as the cor-
relation between own attitudes and the attitude prediction.
The accuracy-by-other information is the overall prediction
accuracy minus the accuracy-by-own attitudes. Applying
these measures in a series of experiments, it is consistently
found that target familiarity has a negative effect on pre-
diction accuracy when attitude similarity is low. Addition-
ally, the ﬁrst experiment shows that target familiarity does
not affect the level of projection or accuracy-by-own atti-
tudes. Instead, familiarity is found to have a negative effect
on accuracy-by-other information. A second experiment
provides evidence that this negative familiarity effect on
other information was mainly caused by an overweighing
of pre-stored target information at the cost of more relevant
product-speciﬁc attitude feedback of their partner. The third
experiment further demonstrates that, although predictors
properly encoded the attitude feedback, they did not fully
use this information during subsequent product predictions.
EXPERIMENT 1
Stimuli, Participants, and Design
We compiled a heterogeneous set of 30 different bedroom
images from furniture store catalogs, interior decoration
magazines, and internet sitestoserveasproductalternatives.
Each product alternative consisted of a picture of the bed-
room, the brand name (e.g., Vannes, Cerenna, and so forth),
a description of the set-up (e.g., bed, two bedside tables and
dresser), the ﬁnishing (e.g., cherry, rattan, and so on), and
the price. The stimuli were scanned from catalogs or down-
loaded from the Internet to be presented on a color computer
monitor.
Thirty-ﬁve couples who were in a relationship for at least
6 mo. (average 28 mo.) were invited to the laboratory. Par-
ticipants were seated in separate, individual cubicles
equipped with a computer on which the experiment was
conducted. During the entire session, the participants had
no contact with their partner or other participants. First,they
provided their own attitudestowardthe30differentfurniture
sets (by choosing “positive” or “negative”). Next, half of
the participants were asked to predicttheirpartner’sattitudes
(positive or negative) toward those furniture sets. After each
prediction, the partner’s actual attitude (positive ornegative)
was presented. The other participants followed the same
procedure, but instead of their partner’s furniture attitudes,
they were asked to predict the attitudes of a stranger, called
person X. However, in reality, this person X was also their
partner. So, the relationship partner was the target’s true
identity for all participants, but for half of them this was
disguised.
We also included similarity in our design. Similarity was
calculated as the correlation between the predictor’s and the
partner’s actual product attitudes, on which a median split
was performed (median p .19). This resulted in a 2 (fa-
miliarity: disguised vs. revealed) # 2 (similarity: low vs.
high similars) between-subjects design.
Results
The reported results were obtained by analyzing each
participant as an individual observation. As suggested by
the reviewers, we reanalyzed our data on two subsets that
included just one member of each couple to account for
potential interdependence between the observations. The re-
sults on both subsets replicated the ﬁndings that are reported
in the currentand subsequentexperimentsandarenotfurther
documented.
Our main hypothesis was that target familiarity would
negatively affect prediction accuracy. Next to a positive
effect of similarity on accuracy ( , ; M p .14 M p .42 low high
, ), the results partiallyconﬁrmed F(1,66) p 40.70 p ! .0001
our hypothesis. People who predicted their partner’s atti-
tudes ( ) were less accurate than those for whom M p .24
target familiarity was disguised ( ; M p .36 F(1,66) p
, ). However, the effect of familiarity was qual- 3.08 p ! .09
iﬁed by similarity ( , ; panel A of ﬁg. F(1,66) p 4.50 p ! .04
1). Post hoc analyses showed that low similars predicted the
product attitudes less accurately when the target’s true iden-
tity was revealed ( ) compared to when it was dis- M p .05
guised ( ). For high similars, no effect of target M p .22
familiarity was observed ( , ). To ob- M p .41 M p .43 disg rev
tain an explanation for these observed effects, weperformed
similar analysis on the other prediction measures.
First, target familiarity did not inﬂuence the accuracy-by-
own attitudes component ( , ; panel B F(1,66) p .62 p 1 .43
of ﬁg. 1). The level of accuracy that the participantsobtained
by projecting their own product attitudes was not signiﬁ-
cantly different in the revealed condition ( ) com- M p .12
pared to the disguised condition ( ). We found only M p .14
that high similars ( ), unsurprisingly, obtained a M p .26
higher level of accuracy-by-own attitudes than low similars
( ; , ). More interest- M p .00 F(1,66) p 84.29 p ! .0001
ingly, we observed a signiﬁcant familiarity by similarity
interaction effect on theaccuracy-by-otherinformationcom-
ponent ( , ; panel C of ﬁg. 1). Post F(1,66) p 11.04 p ! .01
hoc analyses revealed that, for low similars, the accuracy-
by-other information was lower when the target’s identity
was revealed ( ) compared to when it was disguised M p .05
( ). For high similars, this negative familiarityeffect M p .23
was not observed ( , ). M p .13 M p .20 disg rev
One possible explanation for these ﬁndings is that low
similars overestimated the similarity with their partner and
heavily weighted their own attitudes, thereby reducing the
impact of other information on prediction accuracy. Yet, the
results on the level of projection showed that participants
did not project signiﬁcantly more when target familiarity396 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 1
EXPERIMENT 1: DECOMPOSITION OF THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN FAMILIARITY AND SIMILARITY
was revealed ( ) than when it was disguised M p .45
( ; , ). Instead, we found only M p .42 F(1,66) p .27 p 1 .60
that high similars ( ) projected more than low sim- M p .56
ilars ( ; , ). Thus, the par- M p .32 F(1,66) p 18.10 p ! .0001
ticipants adapted their level of projection to their actuallevel
of attitude similarity, independently of their familiarity with
the target.
Discussion
This study provides support for our main hypothesis. In
the presence of product-speciﬁc attitude information, target
familiarity can cause prediction inaccuracy. This was ob-
served only when similarity on furniture attitudes was low
and, therefore, own attitudes are a nondiagnostic cue for the
attitude predictions. The simplest explanation is that con-
sumers, when predicting the product attitudes of familiar
but dissimilar others, continue to rely heavily on their own
product attitudes at the cost of more diagnostic, other in-
formation. Yet, the results on the amount of projection are
inconsistent with this overprojection explanation. Previous
studies that observed higher levels of projection among fa-
miliars typically focused on sensitive issues that are more
central to the relationship (e.g., Davis and Rusbult 2001).
It is quite likely that the partner’s furniture attitudes are not
perceived as critical to the relationship and, therefore, no
overprojection occurred. A second explanation is that target
familiarity negatively affects the validity of own attitudes
when similarity is low. It could be that predictors, who
receive attitude feedback about their partner that is incon-
gruent with the self, elicit thoughts about their own product
attitudes resulting in unstable own attitudes (Wilson and
Schooler 1991). However, besides not affecting the weight
of own attitudes, target familiarity also had no effect on the
accuracy component caused by own attitudes. Thus, we can
conclude that neither differences in weight nor in validity
can explain the observed negative effect of target familiarity
on prediction accuracy.
What is causing the accuracy differences then? The over-
all accuracy difference is entirely reﬂected in the accuracy-
by-other information component. When similarity is low,
predictors are found to rely heavily on other information
beyond own attitudes, and this is where it goes wrong. More
speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings suggest that the predictive quality
of the other information about the partner is signiﬁcantly
lower than that about a stranger. Since this other information
consists of both pre-stored target information and the prod-
uct-speciﬁc feedback, this implies that target familiarity
must negatively affect the validity or weight of these two
types of information. Given that the validity of the product-
speciﬁc feedback (i.e., the partner’s actual product attitudes)
is independent of our familiarity manipulation, one of the
remaining explanations of our ﬁndings is that the pre-stored
information about a familiar target is less valid than that of
a stranger. People predicting the attitudes of an unfamiliar
target can rely only on general and stereotypicalinformation
about the stranger, which may be quite diagnostic (Nisbett
and Kunda 1985). When predicting familiar targets, they
are likely to ignore this valid information. Instead, they use
more speciﬁc target information that is often found to be
invalid or irrelevant when predicting product attitudes (e.g.,
Davis et al. 1986; Swann and Gill 1997). To test this ex-
planation, we manipulate the availability of feedback in ex-
periment 2. When no product-speciﬁc feedback is provided,
we are able to observe the effect of target familiarity on the
prediction validity of pre-stored target information only.TARGET FAMILIARITY AND PREDICTION ACCURACY 397
EXPERIMENT 2
Stimuli, Participants, and Design
Eighty-four couples (average relationship length of 26
mo.) participated in this experiment. Half of the participants
followed the sameprocedureasinexperiment1andreceived
the actual attitude of their partner after each prediction. The
others followed a similar procedure except that they did not
receive any feedback during the prediction task. The design
was a 2 (familiarity: disguised vs. revealed) # 2 (similarity:
low vs. high similars) # 2 (feedback: no feedback vs. feed-
back) between-subjects design.
Results
If the familiarity effect is mainly driven by differences
in pre-stored target information, then we should also ﬁnd
an effect of target familiarity on prediction accuracy in the
no feedback conditions. We observed a three-way interac-
tion effect on prediction accuracy ( , F(1,159) p 3.65 p !
; panel A of ﬁg. 2). When the predictors receivedattitude .06
feedback, as in experiment 1, the results conﬁrmed that the
familiarity effect on accuracy depended on the level of sim-
ilarity ( , ). Low similars for whom F(1,77) p 7.76 p ! .01
target familiarity was disguised ( ) were more ac- M p .24
curate than those for whom it was revealed ( ; M p .06
, ). For high similars, no familiarity F(1,77) p 9.19 p ! .01
effect was observed ( , ; M p .26 M p .32 F(1,77) p disg rev
, ). Interestingly, when predictors received no .90 p 1 .34
feedback, the signiﬁcant familiarity by similarity effect dis-
appeared ( , ) and predictionaccuracy F(1,82) p .001 p 1 .98
was affected only by similarity ( , ; M p .13 M p .29 low high
, ). This suggests that pre-stored F(1,82) p 13.20 p ! .001
information about an alleged stranger is equally diagnostic
as pre-stored information about a familiar target. If this is
true, we should also observe no effects of familiarity on
accuracy-by-other information when no feedback was pro-
vided and the other information consisted only of pre-stored
target information.
While we again observed only a positive effect of sim-
ilarity on accuracy-by-own attitudes ( , M p .02 M p low high
; , ; panel B of ﬁg. 2), we .19 F(1,159) p 115.55 p ! .0001
found the expected three-way interaction on accuracy-by-
other information ( , ; panel C of ﬁg. F(1,159) p 3.77 p ! .05
2). When feedback was provided, the effect of familiarity
was qualiﬁed by similarity ( , ). Low F(1,77) p 4.79 p ! .04
similars used more valid other information when target fa-
miliarity was disguised ( ) compared to when it was M p .21
revealed ( ; , ). For high M p .02 F(1,77) p 12.59 p ! .001
similars, this difference was not signiﬁcant ( , M p .09 disg
; , ). Yet, inthenofeedback M p .10 F(1,77) p .03 p 1 .85 rev
condition, target familiarity did not signiﬁcantly affect ac-
curacy-by-other information ( , ; M p .09 M p .13 disg rev
,) . F(1,82) p .66 p 1 .42
The results on the level of projection further conﬁrmed
that, also in this experiment, target familiarity did not affect
the weight given to own attitudes ( , M p .38 M p disg rev
; , ). We observed only that high .44 F(1,159) p 2.18 p 1 .14
similars ( ) projected more than low similars M p .47
(; , ) . M p .35 F(1,159) p 8.70 p ! .01
Discussion
The ﬁndings of the present experiment rule out the pos-
sibility that the pre-stored information for predicting a fa-
miliar target is lower in quality than the general information
to predict an alleged stranger. This means that an overly
heavy weight on pre-stored target information at the cost of
product-speciﬁc attitude feedback is the only remaining ex-
planation for the observed familiarity effects. Thepre-stored
information that people possess about their partner is ex-
tensive. Hence, it could be that this elaborate knowledge
makes predictors overly conﬁdent, such that they even do
not attend to the product-speciﬁc attitude feedback (Swann
and Gill 1997). Alternatively, it could also bethatpredictors,
even though they attend to thefeedback, fail tolearnbecause
they assume that they already possess diagnostic prediction
cues or because they interpret the feedback to be consistent
with pre-stored beliefsandexpectations(StapelandSchwarz
1998). Third, it is possible that predictors attend to product-
speciﬁc attitude feedback and also learn from it, but still
retrieve some pre-stored target information. Previousstudies
observed that, even if available information is irrelevant,
predictors try to extract useful information from it (e.g.,
Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989). In exper-
iment 3, we investigate whether the familiarity effect was
mainly caused by attention, learning, or retrieval biases by
manipulating the moment that we revealed the target as
being the predictor’s partner and by adding a memory test.
We also wanted to investigate to what extent our ﬁndings
could be generalized across learning tasks. Therefore, we
added a purely observational learning task (cf. Broniarczyk
and Alba 1994). This learning task is more realistic, less
involving, and morelimitedthantheprediction-learningtask
used in the previous experiments. In thelatter,peoplereceive
information not only about the prediction target but also
about the validity of their prediction strategy.
EXPERIMENT 3
Stimuli, Participants, and Design
We added more stimuli to obtain 60 bedroom furniture
sets in total. One hundred and twelve couples (average ac-
quaintance of 26 mo.) provided their own attitudes toward
all bedroom sets. Next, they completed three more tasks: a
learning task, a prediction task, and a memory test. During
the learning task, participants either predicted and subse-
quently received the target’s actual attitudes or they im-
mediately observed the target’s product attitudes toward a
ﬁrst subset of 30 bedroom sets. In the prediction task, all
participants predicted their target’s attitudes on the remain-
ing 30 bedroom sets, and no feedback on the actual attitudes
was provided. The two bedroom subsets were counterbal-
anced, and the presentation order within each subset wasFIGURE 2
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FIGURE 3
EXPERIMENT 3: DECOMPOSITION OF THE MAIN EFFECT
OF TARGET FAMILIARITY
randomized. Finally, during a memory test, participants
were asked to recall the target’s attitudes (positive,negative,
or no idea) toward 15 furniture sets that were randomly
chosen from those they saw during the learning task. The
computer program failed to store the answers on this mem-
ory test of one participant. This participant was excluded
from the analyses that were performed on the memory test
data.
Following Cohen (1981), we disentangled the familiarity
effect on the encoding (i.e., attention and learning)processes
from its effect on retrieval by manipulating the moment of
target identiﬁcation: before the learning task, after learning
but before the prediction task, or not at all. For participants
in the prelearning condition, target familiarity can affect
encoding during the learning task as well as retrieval of
attitude information during the subsequent prediction task.
In the postlearning condition, familiarity may still affect the
retrieval, but not encoding. Finally, target familiarity cannot
inﬂuence any of these processes in the control condition
where the target’s identity remained disguised. In sum, this
experiment had a 3 (familiarity: prelearning vs. postlearning
vs. control) # 2 (similarity: low vs. high similars) # 2
(learning task: prediction vs. observation) between-subjects
design.
Results
If differential attention was causing the familiarity effect,
then participants in the prelearning condition should recall
less original product attitudes during the memory test com-
pared to those in the other conditions. Yet, no effect of target
familiarity was observed ( , , M p 10.75 M p 10.75 pre post
; , ). We found M p 10.10 F(2,213) p 10.11 p 1 .10 control
only that people who observed the attitudes during thelearn-
ing task ( ) recalled more attitudes correctly than M p 11.29
those who learned by prediction ( ; M p 9.78 F(1,213) p
,) . 27.87 p ! .0001
If familiarity affects learning from attitude feedback, then
prediction accuracy in the prelearning condition should be
lower than in the postlearning condition. As expected, the
main effect of target familiarity on prediction accuracy was
signiﬁcant ( , ; panel A of ﬁg. 3). F(2,214) p 5.89 p ! .01
However, no difference was observed between the prelearn-
ing ( ) and postlearning condition ( ; M p .19 M p .22
, ). Instead, participants in the pre- F(1,214) p 1.03 p 1 .31
learning and postlearning conditions ( ) were less M p .21
accurate compared to those in the control condition (M p
; , ). This is inconsistent with .30 F(1,214) p 10.81 p ! .01
the learning explanation but in line with the retrieval ex-
planation. Although target familiarity did not bias the at-
tention paid to and learning from the attitude feedback dur-
ing the learning task, it induced retrieval deﬁciencies during
the subsequent prediction task. These effects were found
independent of the learning task ( , F(1,214) p 1.03 p 1
). Additionally we observed that participantswholearned .35
the target’s furniture attitudes by prediction ( ) M p .26
tended to be more accurate than those who learned by ob-
servation ( ; , ) and that M p .21 F(1,214) p 3.75 p ! .06
similarity had again a positive effect on accuracy (M p low
,; , ) . .16 M p .32 F(1,214) p 39.62 p ! .0001 high
While we observed only a positive effect of similarity
(, ; ,) M p .01 M p .17 F(1,214) p 253.81 p ! .0001 low high
on accuracy-by-own attitudes (see panel B of ﬁg. 3), the
effects of familiarity on accuracy-by-other informationwere
again in favor of the retrieval explanation (F(2,214) p
, ; panel C of ﬁg. 3). The accuracy was lower 9.86 p ! .0001
for participants in the pre- and postlearning conditions
( ) compared to those in the control condition M p .11
( ; , ) but did not differ M p .22 F(1,214) p 25.63 p ! .0001
between the prelearning ( ) and postlearning con- M p .10400 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
ditions ( ; , ). Thus, the M p .13 F(1,214) p 1.43 p 1 .23
negative effect of target familiarity on the prediction quality
of other information could not be accounted for by an at-
tention or learning bias but was mainly caused by the re-
trieval of less diagnostic information during the prediction
task.
Consistent with the previous results on the level of pro-
jection, high similars ( ) were found to put more M p .49
weight on their own attitudes than low similars ( ; M p .29
, ). Again, target familiarity did F(1,214) p 53.90 p ! .0001
not affect projection of own attitudes ( , M p .41 pre
,; , ) . M p .42 M p .32 F(2,214) p 2.04 p 1 .12 post control
Discussion
The results of experiment 3 are inconsistent with the en-
coding explanations but in line with a retrieval explanation.
Although partners attend to and learn from feedback about
each other’s product attitudes, they fail to retrieve this di-
agnostic information when predicting their partner’s atti-
tudes toward products of the same category. It should be
noted that similarity did not qualify this negative effect of
target familiarity in the present experiment. Although av-
erage attitude similarity did not differ signiﬁcantly from that
in previous experiments ( , ), partic- F(1,460) p .39 p 1 .53
ipants seemed to project less in the current experiment
( , ). Unlike predictors in the pre- F(1,460) p 2.80 p ! .09
vious experiments, participants in this experiment already
received all 30 instances of attitude feedback before pre-
dicting their partner’s attitudes. This could explain why the
participants of this experiment relied more on other infor-
mation beyond own attitudes, even when attitude similarity
is high. This higher reliance on other information verylikely
induced the observed retrieval problems for all participants.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Research on productattitudepredictionssuggests,andthis
research conﬁrms, that familiarity with another consumer is
not particularly helpful when predicting the other’s product
attitudes. Moreover, our study provides the ﬁrst evidence
that target familiarity even hurts prediction accuracy in the
presence of product-speciﬁc attitude feedback. The negative
effect of target familiarity on prediction accuracy was es-
pecially strong when predictor and target had dissimilar
product attitudes. Consistent with the literature on false con-
sensus (e.g., Marks and Miller 1987), this could indicate
that consumers continue to rely heavily on theirown product
attitudes when predicting those of a familiar, but dissimilar,
target. However, the observation that predictors reduced the
weight of their own attitudes when similarity with their
partner was low, thereby increasing the weight of other in-
formation, is inconsistent with this overprojection bias (ex-
periment 1). Thus, the negative effect of target familiarity
on prediction accuracy is very likely caused by differential
quality of other information beyond own attitudes. One ex-
planation that can account for this is the low validity of pre-
stored partner information. Consistent with previous studies
(e.g., Davis at al. 1986), pre-stored information about fa-
miliar targets was not more diagnostic than general and
stereotypical information about strangers when predicting
furniture preferences (experiment 2). However, it is impor-
tant to note that pre-stored partner information was also not
signiﬁcantly worse than general and stereotypical infor-
mation about strangers. Hence, lower quality of pre-stored
partner information cannot account for the negative famil-
iarity effect that was observed when attitude feedback was
presented. Thus, although overprojection of own attitudes
and low validity of pre-stored information about familiar
others may have contributed to the low levels of prediction
accuracy that are observed in previous studies, they cannot
explain the negative familiarity effect found in the current
experiments.
Instead, our results suggest that predictors put an overly
heavy weight on pre-stored partner information relative to
speciﬁc information about the partner’s product attitudes
(experiment 3). Why would consumers underweigh newand
more diagnostic partner feedback? First, the predictor’sabil-
ity to recall recently observed product attitudes was not
affected by target familiarity. This indicates that consumers
attend to feedback about their partner’s product attitudes at
least as well as to that of an alleged stranger. Furthermore,
predictors learned equally well from feedback belonging to
the partner as from feedback belonging to a stranger. Yet,
consumers were still less accurate in predicting their part-
ner’s product attitudesduring thesubsequentpredictiontask.
So instead of taking full advantage of the newly encoded
attitude information, partners are still inclined to retrieve
pre-stored target information that is less diagnostic for pre-
dicting each other’s product attitudes.
Now that retrieval biases are identiﬁed as the main un-
derlying problem in the prediction of familiar others’ prod-
uct attitudes, the question of why target familiarity induces
these retrieval biases arises. When target familiarity is high,
the few diagnostic cues from product-speciﬁc attitude feed-
back are among an enormous amount of pre-stored target
information. As documented in the no feedback condition
of experiment 2, this pre-stored information is not very di-
agnostic for predicting product-speciﬁc attitudes. Still, pre-
dictors are found to use irrelevant prediction cues, thereby
diluting the impact of the newly encoded product-speciﬁc
information (e.g., Nisbett etal.1981).Moreover,thisdilution
effect is found to be even stronger when predictors are ac-
countable for their prediction (Tetlock and Boettger 1989).
Presumably, predictors also felt more accountable when pre-
dicting the attitudes of familiar others, like their partner,
compared to those of a complete stranger, and this may have
further bolstered the dilution of newly encoded and truly
diagnostic attitude information. More support for this rea-
soning is also found in the introspection literature. Too
closely analyzing reasons for our preferences might cause
less optimal prediction of our true preferences (e.g., Wilson
and Schooler 1991). Similarly, reﬂection about why partners
may like or dislike a certain product may cause predictorsTARGET FAMILIARITY AND PREDICTION ACCURACY 401
FIGURE A1
NOTE.—Based on Hoch (1988, ﬁg. on 317). Used by permission.
to retrieve less diagnostic information out of the huge
amount of partner information that is available to them.
It should be noted that similarity in product attitudes was
found to outweigh to a large extent the retrieval problems
due to target familiarity (experiments 1 and 2). When at-
titude similarity was high, predictors relied heavily on their
own attitudes to predict those of their partner and did not
retrieve a lot of other information beyond own attitudes.
Thus, retrieval biases are unlikely to emerge when attitude
similarity ishigh becausepredictorssimplyprojecttheirown
attitudes. One could argue that situations of low attitude
similarity are artiﬁcial because the literature suggests that
similarity is an important determinant of both partner choice
and relationship success (e.g., Buss 1985). We argue that
this is undoubtedly true for important aspects of life (e.g.,
ideology, values) but not with respect to all the innumerable
speciﬁc preferences that drive decisions in everyday con-
sumer life. Especially in these situations where similarity is
low and feedback provides an important source of infor-
mation, target familiarity has been found to negativelyaffect
prediction accuracy. Moreover, when predictors possess an
extended amount of product-speciﬁc attitude information
about the partner and shift from own attitudes to other in-
formation, retrieval biases were found to be independent of
attitude similarity (experiment 3).
Obviously, further research is needed to explore the ge-
neralizability of our results. Our experiments were limited
to one product category: bedroom furniture. First, this prod-
uct category was chosen because chances were small that
participants had pre-stored knowledge of their partner’sspe-
ciﬁc attitudes toward the presented bedroom sets. Therefore,
they actually had to predict the other’s attitudes instead of
just retrieving them from memory (Hoch 1984). Second,
buying decisions with respect to furniture are typicallymade
jointly, and, consequently, they are a relevant prediction
subject in a partner context (Davis and Rigaux 1974). We
agree that this speciﬁc product category might have been
quite unfamiliar to our participants (i.e., students).However,
in reality, buying decisions that involve other consumers are
also typically complex and uncommon (e.g., houses, cars,
furniture, ﬁnancial products) or concern products that were
not perceived or discussed before (e.g., new vacation des-
tinations). Nevertheless, the extendibility of our ﬁndings to
more simple and common product categories warrants fur-
ther investigation. Additionally, we restricted the attitude
information to electronic exchange of overall product atti-
tudes, devoid of physical contact or communication. This
was necessary to extract the speciﬁc effect of target famil-
iarity while keeping the target person constant. Despite this
restriction, our results already suggest that different feed-
back formats can affect the prediction process (experiment
3). Attitude prediction accuracy is better when feedback is
provided in a prediction setting as opposed to an observa-
tional setting, but the opposite is true for attitude recall. This
indicates that the effect of different feedback settings might
be quite complex and counterintuitive, making future re-
search on this topic worthwhile.
APPENDIX
Figure A1 is Hoch’s (1988, 317) representation of the
interpersonal prediction task, where the predictor makes a
prediction (P) about the target’s actual product attitude (T).
Based on this framework, attitude predictions can be ex-
pressed in the following one-cue lens model (Hoch 1987,
224):
P p B + BO+ Z, 01
with P p predicted product attitude of target, B1 p weight
given to own attitudes, O p own attitudes, and Z p other
factors used to predict the target’s attitudes. In standardized
form this can be expressed as
2 p p bo + (1  b )z,402 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
with b p projection level or r(p, o). Prediction accuracy
r(p, t) can than be written as
2 r(t,p) p br(t,o)+(1  b )r(t,z),
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